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We build a two country asymmetric DSGE model with two features: (i) endogenous and slow
di⁄usion of technologies from the developed to the developing country, and (ii) adjustment costs
to investment ￿ ows. We calibrate the model to match the Mexico-U.S. trade and FDI ￿ ows.
The model is able to explain the following stylized facts: (i) U.S. and Mexican output co-move
more than consumption; (ii) U.S. shocks have a larger e⁄ect on Mexico than in the U.S.; (iii)
U.S. business cycles lead over medium term ￿ uctuations in Mexico; (iv) Mexican consumption
is more volatile than output.
Keywords: Business Cycles in Developing Countries, Co-movement between Developed and
Developing economies, Volatility, Extensive Margin of Trade, Product Life Cycle, FDI.
JEL Classi￿cation: E3, O3."Poor Mexico! So far from God and so close to the United States." Attributed to
Dictator Por￿rio Diaz, 1910.
Business cycle ￿ uctuations in developed economies tend to have very strong e⁄ects on de-
veloping countries. Take for example the so-called Great Recession which started in the U.S.
at the end of 2007. Between then and the ￿rst quarter of 2009, U.S. GDP had contracted
by 2.2%. Mexico￿ s economy was showing no sign of distress until the U.S. recession began.
However, by the ￿rst quarter of 2009, Mexico￿ s GDP had declined by 7.8%. Mexico was not
the only country importantly a⁄ected by the U.S. recession. Many developing economies such
as Malaysia, South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan su⁄ered GDP contractions larger than
the U.S. despite the initial soundness of their economy.1
These casual observations are hard to reconcile with standard international macro models.
In these models, shocks are transmitted internationally because of their e⁄ect on the demand
for exports.2 As a result, foreign and domestic GDPs co-move positively. However, as shown
below, the predicted e⁄ect of domestic shocks on foreign GDP is signi￿cantly smaller and more
transitory than we see in the data.
The objective of this paper is twofold: our ￿rst goal is to develop a quantitative model
capable of explaining the amplitude and persistence of the e⁄ect that U.S. shocks have on
Mexico￿ s macroeconomic variables. Our second goal is to use the model to provide an account
of the drivers of business ￿ uctuations in developing economies. In particular, we explore the
relative contributions of domestic and U.S. shocks to Mexico￿ s GDP ￿ uctuations.
In Section 2, we present evidence that U.S. high frequency ￿ uctuations a⁄ect Mexico￿ s macro-
economic variables at medium term frequencies. In particular, HP-￿ltered U.S. GDP leads
medium term ￿ uctuations in both Mexico￿ s GDP and embodied productivity. It is di¢ cult
to imagine that these protracted e⁄ects result from conventional propagation mechanisms in
business cycle models. Rather, we show that, over the medium term, the range of technolo-
gies imported from the U.S. leads Mexico￿ s productivity measures. Furthermore, the ￿ ow of
1In a sample of countries, GDP declined as follows: Malaysia 7.8%, Philipines 12.1%, Singapore 7.4%, South
Korea 3.3%, Taiwan 13.8%, Thailand 7.7%. In some of these Asian countries, high demand from China led to
a recovery by the end of 2009 or the beginning of 2010.
2Unlike developed economies, as a result of the ￿nancial and banking regulations and practices imposed after
the Asian crisis, the banking systems of most developing economies were very healthy before and during the
Great Recession and did not contribute to its propagation (e.g. Zeti, 2002, Zamani, 2005, BIS, 2006).
1new technologies exported from the U.S. to Mexico strongly co-moves with the U.S. business
cycle. These ￿ndings suggest that U.S. business cycle ￿ uctuations a⁄ect the speed of di⁄usion
of technologies to Mexico and, through this channel, drive the medium term level of embodied
productivity.
In Section 3, we develop our model. We consider a two-country (i.e. the U.S. and Mexico),
asymmetric real business cycle model modi￿ed to allow for endogenous productivity, entry and
adjustment costs to investment. We introduce entry to capture the strong counter-cyclicality of
the relative price of capital. We introduce investment adjustment costs to be consistent with the
micro evidence on investment frictions in Mexico (Gelos and Isgut, 2001; Iscan, 2000; Warner
1992, 1994). We incorporate endogenous productivity in order to provide a uni￿ed explanation
for the comovements of U.S. GDP, and Mexico￿ s GDP and relative price of capital over the
high and medium term. Another reason for this decision is that many authors have questioned
the importance of high frequency technology shocks and argued that short term ￿ uctuations in
the Solow residual re￿ ect unmeasured input utilization and imperfect competition as opposed
to true technology shifts (e.g. Burnside et al., 1995; Basu, 1996). Endogenous productivity,
however, provides an avenue through which shocks may a⁄ect medium term ￿ uctuations in
productivity without having to rely on exogenous shifts in technology.
To endogenize productivity dynamics, we use a variation of Comin and Gertler￿ s (2006) model
of R&D and technology di⁄usion. We expand their framework to a two-country economy and
allow for (slow) international di⁄usion of technologies and for foreign direct investment (FDI).
Rotemberg (2003), for example, has argued that in modeling cyclical productivity dynamics it
is important to take into account the di⁄usion lags. It is well known (e.g. Comin and Hobijn,
2010) that adoption lags are signi￿cantly longer in developing than in developed economies.
Considering this, we calibrate our model to allow for realistic steady-state time lags between
the creation of technologies in the U.S. and their di⁄usion to Mexico. At the same time,
because the speed of di⁄usion varies endogenously with the cycle, the framework can produce
pro-cyclical medium-term movements in Mexico￿ s productivity in response to U.S. shocks.
The endogenous international di⁄usion of technologies in our framework di⁄ers from produc-
tion sharing (e.g. Bergin et al., 2009; Burnstein et al., 2008) because it generates endogenous
￿ uctuations in embodied productivity. A second di⁄erence with production sharing and with
trade in varieties models (e.g. Ghironi and Melitz, 2005) is that, since in our model the di⁄usion
of technologies involves a sunk investment, the range of exported technologies becomes a state
variable. As we show in section 5, the dynamics of the stock of di⁄used technologies drive the
2evolution of productivity over the medium term, and, through that channel, have important
e⁄ects on the cyclical properties of Mexico￿ s economy.
We introduce FDI because it permits the transfer of production of some goods to Mexico that
are then exported to the U.S. As a result, a bilateral trade ￿ ow arises endogenously. Introducing
FDI also allows us to capture realistically the nature of capital ￿ ows to developing countries,
of which, since 1990, 70% have been in the form of FDI (Loayza and Serven, 2006).3
Section 4 presents some model simulations and considers how well the framework captures
the broad data patterns. Overall, our model does a reasonably good job in characterizing the
key features of short and medium term ￿ uctuations in Mexico. In doing so, it sheds light on
several important open questions in international macroeconomics. Unlike many RBC models
(e.g. Backus, Kehoe and Kydland, 1992) our model generates a higher cross-country correlation
of output than consumption. Our model matches the cross-country correlation in both output
and consumption because what drives the short term cross-country co-movement in output is
the pro-cyclical response of Mexico￿ s investment to U.S. shocks. Mexico￿ s consumption, on the
other hand, does not respond much contemporaneously to U.S. shocks.
Our model also generates a large initial response of Mexico￿ s GDP to U.S. shocks. Fur-
thermore, the model reproduces the lead of U.S. short term ￿ uctuations over medium term
￿ uctuations in both Mexico￿ s GDP and embodied productivity.
Two other features of the data that our model generate are the counter-cyclicality of real
interest rates and the current account in developing countries (e.g. Neumayer and Perri, 2005).
Mexico￿ s interest rates are counter-cyclical because domestic shocks cause counter-cyclical ￿ uc-
tuations in the relative price of capital that dominate the pro-cyclical response of the marginal
product of capital. Since imports are used to produce new investment, the pro-cyclicality of
investment leads to a counter-cyclical current account.
Finally, the strong counter-cyclical response of domestic real interest rates to Mexican shocks
permits our model to rationalize a regularity identi￿ed by Aguiar and Gopinath (2007). Namely,
that consumption is more volatile than output in developing countries.
Section 4 also reports a decomposition of the volatility of Mexican short and medium term
￿ uctuations. We ￿nd that approximately two thirds of the volatility of Mexico￿ s output ￿ uctu-
ations is due to U.S. shocks. We reach this conclusion despite ￿nding that Mexico￿shocks are
approximately 33% more volatile than U.S. shocks. Concluding remarks are in Section 5.
3The FDI share is even larger when restricting attention to private capital ￿ ows and when focusing in Latin
America and Asia.
31 The cyclicality of technology di⁄usion
In this section, we provide evidence on the role of technology di⁄usion in the propagation of
U.S. business cycles to Mexico. Since we intend to identify the drivers of persistent ￿ uctuations
in the Mexican economy, we focus not only on conventional business cycle ￿ uctuations but also
on ￿ uctuations at medium term frequencies. Following Comin and Gertler (2006), we de￿ne
the medium term cycle as ￿ uctuations with periods smaller than 50 years.4 The medium term
cycle can be decomposed into a high frequency component and a medium term component. The
high frequency component captures ￿ uctuations with periods smaller than 8 years while the
medium term component captures ￿ uctuations with periods between 8 and 50 years. We use
a Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter to isolate ￿ uctuations at the high frequency. We isolate the medium
term component and the medium term cycle using a band pass ￿lter, which is basically a two-
sided moving average ￿lter, where the moving average depends on the frequencies of the data
one tries to isolate. The medium term cycle roughly corresponds to the sum of the high and
medium term components in the data.
In this section, we focus on three variables. We use GDP as a measure of output both
in the U.S. and Mexico. We use the relative price of new capital in Mexico as measured by
the investment de￿ ator over the GDP de￿ ator, a variable which has been used by Greenwood,
Hercowitz and Krusell (2000) as a measure of the inverse of embodied productivity. Finally,
we use the number of 6-digit SIC codes within durable manufacturing for which U.S. exports
to Mexico are at least $1 million. Broda and Weinstein (2006) use this variable to measure the
range of technologies that di⁄use internationally.
Our data is annual and covers the period 1990-2008. We restrict attention to this period for
two reasons. First, the volume of U.S.-Mexico trade and FDI increased very signi￿cantly during
this period, making the mechanisms emphasized by our model much more relevant than before.
Second, after 1990, FDI became the most signi￿cant source of capital ￿ ows from developed
to developing economies, making our model￿ s assumptions about the nature of international
capital ￿ ows most appropriate for this period.
Figure 1A plots the series of HP-￿ltered GDP in the U.S. and Mexico. Mexico￿ s GDP is
4Comin and Gertler (2006) show that there are approximately six medium term cycles in the U.S. over the
postwar period. Most macroeconomic variables have a higher amplitude of ￿ uctuations (i.e. a higher standard
deviation) in the medium term component than in the high frequency component. Further, Comin and Gertler
(2006) show that, despite the amplitude of the identi￿ed periods, ￿ uctuations in the medium term component
are statistically signi￿cant.
4approximately twice as volatile as the U.S. The cross-country correlation in GDP is 0.43 and,
despite the short length of the series, it is signi￿cant at the 10% level. Beyond this statistic,
we can see that U.S. business ￿ uctuations such as the internet-driven expansion during the
second half of the 1990s, the burst of the dot-com bubble in 2001, the 2002-2007 expansion and
the 2008 ￿nancial crisis are accompanied by similar ￿ uctuations in Mexico. Arguably, none
of the shocks that caused these U.S. ￿ uctuations had a direct e⁄ect on the Mexican economy.
Therefore, the co-movement between Mexico and U.S. GDP resulted from the international
transmission of U.S. business cycles.5
The e⁄ects of U.S. business cycles on Mexico￿ s GDP are very persistent and go beyond con-
ventional business cycle frequencies. Figure 1B plots the medium term component of Mexico￿ s
GDP together with HP-￿ltered U.S. GDP. The lead-lag relationship between these variables
can be most notably seen during the post 1995 expansion, the 2001 recession and the post-2001
expansion. Despite the severity of the e⁄ect of the Tequila crisis on the medium term compo-
nent of Mexico￿ s GDP, the latter strongly recovered with the U.S. post-1995 expansion. The
Mexican medium term recovery lagged the U.S. boom by about two years. The end of Mexico￿ s
expansion also lagged the end of the U.S. expansion by one year. Finally, the post-2001 U.S.
expansion also coincided with a boom in the medium term component of Mexico￿ s GDP.
Table 1A formalizes these observations. The ￿rst row reports the correlation between HP-
￿ltered U.S. GDP at various lags and the medium term component of Mexico￿ s GDP. The
contemporaneous correlation between these series is 0.28 and increases to 0.49 when U.S. GDP
is lagged one year and to 0.53 when lagged two years. In the second row, we ￿nd a similar
co-movement pattern between U.S. GDP and Mexico￿ s embodied productivity. In particular,
U.S. GDP ￿ uctuations present a three-year lead over Mexico￿ s medium term ￿ uctuations in
embodied productivity. Despite the short length of the series, these cross-correlation patterns
are statistically signi￿cant.
What could be propagating U.S. business cycles to Mexico in such a persistent manner? Neo-
classical investment dynamics are an unlikely answer since Nason and Cogley (1995) have shown
that they cannot propagate shocks at these frequencies. Comin and Gertler (2006) argue that
the endogenous technology improvements through R&D and technology adoption propagate
U.S. shocks domestically over medium term frequencies. Could the international propagation
we observe result from the international di⁄usion of technologies?
5The only important Mexican shock over this period was the 1995 recession which, despite its virulence, was
relatively short-lived.
5Table 1B and 1C explore this hypothesis. Table 1B shows that the range of technologies that
￿ ow from the U.S. to Mexico is positively correlated with the U.S. business cycle. Table 1C
shows that the range of durable manufacturing goods imported from the U.S.leads the medium
term components of ￿ uctuations in both Mexico￿ s GDP and embodied productivity.
This evidence suggests that the return to exporting new investment goods from the U.S. to
Mexico co-moves positively with the U.S. business cycle, and that ￿ uctuations in the ￿ ow of
new investment goods may be an important driver of medium term ￿ uctuations in Mexico￿ s
productivity.
2 Model
We now develop a two-country model of medium term business ￿ uctuations. We denote the
countries by North, N, and South, S: The model is annual as opposed to quarterly because, as
noted earlier, we are interested in capturing ￿ uctuations over a longer horizon than is typically
studied. To this end, we abstract from a number of factors that may be important to understand
quarterly dynamics such as money and nominal rigidities.
Our model is a version of a conventional real business cycle model modi￿ed to allow for
endogenous productivity and relative price of capital. To capture the short-term counter-
cyclicality of the relative price of capital, we introduce two sectors and endogenous entry and
exit. An alternative approach, with similar results, would be to allow for counter-cyclical
markups as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1995).
We endogenize productivity by introducing endogenous R&D and international di⁄usion of
technologies. Technologies are embodied in intermediate goods. Productivity depends on the
number of intermediate goods available for production. As in the product cycle literature (e.g.
Vernon, 1966; Wells, 1972; and Stokey, 1991), intermediate goods are invented in N as a result
of R&D investments: After the producer incurs in a stochastic (sunk) investment, the good can
be exported to S (i.e. it di⁄uses to S). After a ￿nal stochastic investment, which we interpret
as FDI, the production of the intermediate good is transferred to S and the good is exported
from S to N:
Households are conventional. Exogenous shocks to the disutility from working drive ￿ uctu-
ations. Following Hall (1997) and others, we interpret these disturbances as a reduced form
of more fundamental forces that a⁄ect the degree of rigidities in labor markets (i.e. wage
markups).
6We ￿rst describe the endogenous evolution of technology. We then discuss the production
of capital and output and the household￿ s problem. Finally, we characterize the complete
equilibrium.
2.1 Technology
The sophistication of the production process in country c depends on the number of intermediate
goods available for production, Act: There are three types of intermediate goods. There are
Al
t local intermediate goods that are only available for production in N. There are A
g
t global
intermediate goods that have successfully di⁄used to S: These goods are produced in N and
exported to S; and are available for production in both N and S: There are AT
t intermediate
goods whose production has been transferred to S: These goods are exported from S to N and
are available for production in both N and S: The total number of intermediate goods in each













Next, we present the conditions that characterize the technology dynamics in each economy.
Creation of New Intermediate Goods.￿Innovators in N engage in R&D by investing ￿nal
output to develop new intermediate goods. Each innovator, p, has access to the following
technology:
ANt+1 (p) ￿ ANt (p) = ’tSt(p) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)ANt(p); (3)
where ANt(p) denotes her stock of invented goods, St(p) are her expenditures in R&D, (1 ￿ ￿)
is the per-period probability that an intermediate good becomes obsolete, and ’t represents the
productivity of the R&D technology, which is taken as given by the innovator.
We assume that ’t depends on the aggregate stock of intermediate goods in N, ANt, the
medium term wholesale value of the capital stock, P
k
Nt KNt; ￿to be de￿ned below6 ￿and












6Roughly speaking it corresponds to the value of the capital stock priced at the cost of production faced by
individual producers of investment goods.
7with 0 < ￿ ￿ 1 and where ￿ is a scale parameter. This formulation is borrowed from Comin
and Gertler (2006) and allows us to calibrate the elasticity of innovations with respect to R&D
expenditures to match the data. In addition, it ensures the existence of a balanced growth path
without scale e⁄ects.
After developing a new technology, the innovator is granted a patent that protects her rights
to the monopolistic rents from selling the good that embodies it. These rents have a market
value of vt: In equilibrium, agents engage in R&D activities until the cost of developing a new
intermediate good (LHS) equalizes its expected market value (RHS):
1=’t = ￿Et [￿Nt+1vt+1]; (5)
where ￿Nt+1 is the innovator￿ s stochastic discount factor for returns between t and t + 1:
Equation (5) strongly hints at how the framework generates pro-cyclical R&D. When N
experiences a recession, the expected value of a new local intermediate good, Etvt+1; declines.
That is, since the pro￿t ￿ ow for local goods declines, the bene￿t to creating new varieties of
intermediate goods goes down. R&D spending will decline in response.
International Di⁄usion.￿Producers of local intermediate goods have the option of engaging
in a stochastic investment that, if successful, permits the di⁄usion of the intermediate good to




t); where the function ￿(:) satis￿es
￿
0 > 0; ￿
00 < 0; x
g
t is the amount of ￿nal output invested, and ￿
g
t is a scaling factor.7 We model
￿
g









; with the constant b
g > 0: (6)
The market value of a local intermediate good re￿ ects both the present discounted value

























where ￿t denotes the per period pro￿ts of a local intermediate goods producer and vg is the
market value of a global intermediate good. At any given period, vg is greater than v because
7We do not have to take a strong stand on who engages in the investments in exporting and in transferring
the production of the goods to S. For expositional purposes, we assume it is the innovator, but the model is
isomorphic to one where he auctions the patent and somebody else is in charge of making these investments
afterwards.
8global goods producers enjoy a pro￿t stream from selling goods at both N and S: Shipping the
goods internationally involves an iceberg transport cost. In particular, 1=  (with   < 1) units
of the good need to be shipped so that one unit arrives.
The optimal investment, xg; equalizes, at the margin, the cost and the expected bene￿ts of
exporting the intermediate good to S as shown in the following ￿rst order condition:
1 =





















The marginal cost of investing one unit of output in exporting the good (LHS) is 1, while the
expected marginal bene￿t is equal to the associated increase in the probability of international
di⁄usion times the discounted gain from making the intermediate good global.
It is now easy to see why expenditures in the international di⁄usion of technologies will
move procyclically. During recessions, the value of a global intermediate good declines by more






declines). In this case, x
g
t will
decline since the return to investing in exporting intermediate goods goes down. The reverse,
of course, will happen during booms.
The value of an intermediate good, v
g










































t denotes the per period pro￿ts of a global intermediate goods producer, xT
t is the num-
ber of units of country S0s ￿nal output spent in transferring the production of the intermediate
good to S; ￿(￿T
t xT
t ) is the associated probability of successfully completing this foreign direct
investment, where the function ￿(:) satis￿es ￿
0 > 0; ￿
00 < 0; et is the exchange rate (dollars per
peso), vT is the market value of the company that produces a transferred intermediate good;
and ￿T











Foreign Direct Investment.￿The South has comparative advantage in assembling manufac-
turing goods (e.g. Iyer, 2005). In particular, it takes one unit of ￿nal output to produce a
unit of intermediate good in N, while if the intermediate good is assembled in S, it only takes
1=￿(< 1) units of country S output: This cost advantage results in higher pro￿t ￿ ows from




induces producers of global intermediate goods to transfer the production of intermediate goods
from N to S:
The optimal intensity of FDI, xT
t ; equalizes the private marginal costs and expected bene￿ts
of transferring the production to S: The marginal cost is et, while the expected marginal bene￿t
is the increase in the probability of succeeding in the FDI times the discounted gain from









































Investment.￿Investment is produced in two stages. In a ￿rst stage, a continuum of NK
ct dif-
ferentiated capital goods producers combine the intermediate goods available in the country to
manufacture their capital goods. In a second stage, the di⁄erentiated capital goods are used to
produce competitively new investment.
Speci￿cally, let Ict(r) be the amount of di⁄erentiated capital produced by producer r; and
let Ir
ct(s) be the amount of intermediate good s she demands. Then we can express the amount










; with ￿ > 1: (13)












K > 1: (14)
Each di⁄erentiated capital goods producer holds some market power that enables her to earn
monopolistic rents from selling her capital good. To be operative, capital goods producers need
to incur in an operating cost, ok
ct: We assume that ok
ct is proportional to the sophistication of









c is a positive constant.
Higher rents lead more capital goods producers to enter the production of di⁄erentiated
capital goods. Free entry implies that, in equilibrium, the level of Nk
ct is such that the operating










ct (j) is the price charged by the producer of the jth di⁄erentiated capital good in
country c:
Observe from (13) and (14) that there are e¢ ciency gains in producing new capital from
increasing the number of intermediate inputs, Act; and of di⁄erentiated capital producers, Nk
ct.
As we shall see, these e¢ ciency gains are responsible for the counter-cyclicality of the price of
new capital, P K
ct :8
Output.￿For symmetry with the capital sector, we assume that ￿nal output, Yct; is produced
in two stages. At the ￿rst stage, each of Nct di⁄erentiated output producers, indexed by j,
combines capital, Kcjt; labor, Lcjt, and energy, Ecjt; to produce its di⁄erentiated output, Yct(j);
with the following Cobb-Douglas technology:






where g is the exogenous growth rate of disembodied productivity,9 and U denotes the in-
tensity of utilization of capital. Factor markets (i.e. labor, energy and capital) are perfectly
competitive.
At the second stage, gross output, Yct; is produced competitively by aggregating the Nct







￿; with ￿ > 1: (18)





8An alternative formulation with similar implications for the high frequency ￿ uctuations in the relative price
of capital would be to introduce counter-cyclical price markups.
9For simplicity, we assume that it is exogenous. It is quite straightforward to endogenize it as shown in
Comin and Gertler (2006).
11Free entry equalizes the per period operating pro￿ts to the overhead costs determining the
number of ￿nal goods ￿rms Nct.
￿ ￿ 1
￿
Pct (j)Yct(j) = bcP
K
ctKct (20)
Energy Endowments.￿Oil represents a signi￿cant share of Mexican exports to the U.S. To
account for this in the calibration of the model, we assume that the government in country S
is endowed with Ee
St units of energy. Let Ect denote the aggregate consumption of energy in
country c. Country N imports Ex
t units of energy from country S; and buys the rest of its
energy needs, Ew












For simplicity, we assume that the price of energy, P E, is ￿xed (in terms of N￿ s currency) and
that S0s endowment of energy grows at the steady state growth rate of output.
2.3 Households
Households.￿In each country, there is a representative household that consumes, supplies labor
and saves. It may save by either accumulating capital or lending to innovators. The household
also has equity claims in all monopolistically competitive ￿rms in the country. It makes one
period loans to innovators and also rents capital that it has accumulated directly to ￿rms.
Physical capital does not ￿ ow across countries. Further, there is no other form of international
lending and borrowing. This implies that N0s FDI in S is the only item in S0s ￿nancial account.
Let Cct be consumption and ￿w
ct a shock to the disutility of working. Then the household















subject to the budget constraint
Cct = !ctLct + ￿ct + DctKct ￿ P
k
ctJct + RctBct ￿ Bct+1 ￿ Tct (24)
where ￿ct re￿ ects the pro￿ts of intermediate goods producers paid out fully as dividends to
households, Dct denotes the rental rate of capital, Jct is investment in new capital, Bct is the
12total loans the household makes at t￿1 that are payable at t; and Tct re￿ ects lump sum taxes.
Rct is the (possibly state-contingent) payo⁄ on the loans.
The household￿ s stock of capital evolves as follows:






where gK denotes the steady state growth rate of capital. ￿(Uct) is the depreciation rate which is
increasing and convex in the utilization rate as in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu⁄man (1988).
The convex function ￿c(:) represents the adjustment costs that are incurred when the level
of investment changes over time. We assume that ￿c(1) = 0; ￿
0
c(1) = 0; so that there are
no adjustment costs in the steady state.10 Note also that the function ￿c(:) is indexed by c
re￿ ecting international asymmetries in the magnitude of adjustment costs.
The household￿ s decision problem is simply to choose consumption, labor supply, capital and
bonds to maximize equation (23) subject to (24) and (25).
Government.￿Government spending is ￿nanced every period with lump sum taxes and the
revenues from oil:





The economy has a symmetric sequence of markets equilibrium. The endogenous state variables





t ; intermediate goods. The following system of equations characterizes the
equilibrium.
Resource Constraints and Aggregate Production.￿The uses of output in each country are
divided into consumption, government spending, overhead costs, production of intermediate
goods used in the production of new capital and investments in the creation, di⁄usion and
transfer of intermediate goods:
10This is the speci￿cation for the investment adjustment costs used in Christiano, Eichembaum and Evans
(2005), Jaimovich and Rebelo (2008), and Comin, Gertler and Santacreu (2009).












NtJNt + GNt (27)
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production of investment goods
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production of investment goods
:
The output produced in each country is given by








where the term N
￿￿1
ct re￿ ects the e¢ ciency gains from diversity.
Factor Markets.￿The labor market in each country satis￿es the requirement that the mar-
ginal product of labor equals the product of the price markup and the household￿ s marginal


































Nt = P E and P E
St = P E=et:
Optimal Investment.￿The stock of capital evolves according to the following law of motion:






The adjustment costs introduce a wedge between the price of new capital (P K
ct ) and the
price of installed capital (P I
ct) when the ￿ ow of real investment deviates from the steady state
level. In particular, a reduction in investment raises the price of installed capital because the
adjustment costs in (34) induce a higher cost of investment in the future. As a result, the
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￿c;t+1 = Cct=Cct+1: (37)
Arbitrage between acquisition of capital and loans to innovators and exporters implies
















Free Entry.￿Free entry by ￿nal goods producers in each sector yields the following relation-



















15Pro￿ts, Market Value of Intermediates and Optimal Technology Di⁄usion and FDI.￿The
pro￿ts accrued by local intermediate good producers depend only on the demand conditions in
N, while the pro￿ts of global and transferred intermediate goods depends also on the demand






































































where aNt is the ratio of the e⁄ective number of intermediate goods in N relative to Al
t; and





































The market value of companies that currently hold the patent of a local, global and trans-
ferred intermediate good are, respectively,


































































where the optimal investments in exporting and transferring the production of intermediate






































16The amount of output devoted to developing new technologies through R&D is determined
by the following free entry condition:
St = ￿Et f￿N;t+1vt+1(At+1 ￿ ￿At)g: (51)
These investments in the development and di⁄usion of technology allow us to characterize
the evolution of technology in both countries.
Evolution of Technology:￿The evolution of productivity over the medium and long term in
N and S depends on the dynamics of innovation and international di⁄usion. New technologies











The optimal di⁄usion and adoption conditions together with the laws of motion for Ag; and






































































Observe from (55) and (56) that the e¢ ciency gains associated with Act and Nk
ct reduce the
marginal cost of producing investment. Fluctuations in these variables are responsible for the
17evolution in the short, medium and long run of the price of new capital, P K
ct : However, Act and
Nk
ct a⁄ect P K
ct at di⁄erent frequencies:
Because Act is a non-stationary state variable, it does not ￿ uctuate in the short term. In-
creases in Act re￿ ect embodied technological change and drive the long-run trend in the relative
price of capital. Pro-cyclical investments in the development and di⁄usion of new intermedi-
ate goods lead to pro-cyclical ￿ uctuations in the growth rate of Act; generating counter-cyclical
movements in P K
ct over the medium term. Nk
ct; instead, is a stationary jump variable. Therefore,
the entry/exit dynamics drive only the short term ￿ uctuations in P K
ct :
In light of the frequency at which these mechanisms operate, we can decompose P K
ct into the
product of two terms: the medium term wholesale price, P
K
ct (de￿ned in 57), that is governed
exclusively by technological conditions in the medium term, and a high-frequency component,
P K
ct = ￿ P K





Balance of Payments.￿The current account balance is equal to the trade balance plus the
net income from FDI investments. In equilibrium, a current account de￿cit needs to be ￿nanced
by an identical net in￿ ow of capital. Since the only form of capital that ￿ ows internationally is
foreign direct investment, the ￿nancial account balance is equal to the net in￿ ow of FDI:
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In this section we explore the ability of the model to generate cycles at short and medium term
frequencies that resemble those observed in the data in developed and, specially, in developing
economies. Given our interest in medium term ￿ uctuations, a period in the model is set to
a year. We solve the model by loglinearizing around the deterministic balanced growth path
and then employing the Anderson-Moore code, which provides numerical solutions for general
￿rst order systems of di⁄erence equations. We describe the calibration before turning to some
numerical exercises.
184.1 Calibration
The calibration we present here is meant as a benchmark. We have found that our results are
robust to reasonable variations around this benchmark. To the greatest extent possible, we
use the restrictions of balanced growth to pin down parameter values. Otherwise, we look for
evidence elsewhere in the literature. There are a total of twenty-six parameters summarized in
Table 2. Twelve appear routinely in other studies. Six relate to the process of innovation and
R&D and were introduced in Comin and Gertler (2006). Finally, there are six new parameters
that relate to trade and the process of international di⁄usion of intermediate goods and two
related to the adjustment costs. We defer the discussion of the calibration of the standard and
R&D parameters to the Appendix and focus here on the adjustment costs parameters and those
that govern the interactions between N and S:
We treat asymmetrically adjustment costs in Mexico and the U.S. based on the ample ev-
idence on the thinner secondary markets for capital goods, more prevalent irreversibilities in
plant-level investment, and larger costs of obtaining construction permits and import licenses
in Mexico relative to the U.S. (e.g. Gelos and Isgut, 2001, Gwartney et al., 2007, World Bank,
and Miller and Holmes, 2009). Comin et al. (2009) estimate ￿
00
N(1) structurally using a similar
model with just one country (i.e. the U.S.) and with an endogenous counter-cyclical relative
price of capital as our model. They obtain an estimate close to 0 that is not statistically di⁄erent
from 0. Accordingly, we set ￿
00
N(1) to 0.
It is more intricate to calibrate ￿
00
S(1) since, to the best of our knowledge, there are no
estimates of investment ￿ ow adjustment costs models for developing countries. However, it is
possible to use the existing estimates of quadratic adjustment costs for developing countries
to obtain a reasonable calibration for ￿
00
S(1): As discussed above, investment adjustment costs
introduce a wedge between the price of installed (P I
t ) and uninstalled capital (P K
t ). A natural
way to calibrate ￿
00
S(1) is to set it to a value that allows our model to match the elasticity of the
wedge between P I
St and P K
St with respect to investment. One di⁄erence between models with
quadratic and with investment ￿ ow adjustment costs is that in the former the wedge between
P I
St and P K
St depends only on current investment while in the latter it also depends on future
investment (i.e. JSt+1). Therefore, a natural way to calibrate ￿
00
S(1) is to set it to match the
elasticity of the price wedge to a 1% permanent increase in investment.11 Using the estimates
11In practice, the calibrated value would be the same whether the increment is permanent or only lasts for
two periods.
19from Iscan (2000), and Warner (1992 and 1994), this exercise yields a value for ￿
00
S(1) of 1.5.
We calibrate the six parameters that govern the interactions between N and S by matching
information on trade ￿ ows, and U.S. FDI in Mexico, the micro evidence on the cost of exporting
and the relative productivity of U.S. and Mexico in manufacturing. First, we set ￿ to 2 to match
Mexico￿ s relative cost advantage over the U.S. in manufacturing identi￿ed by Iyer (2005). We
set the inverse of the iceberg transport cost parameter,  ; to 0.95,12 the steady state probability
of exporting an intermediate good, ￿
g; to 0.0875, and the steady state probability of transferring
the production of an intermediate good to S; ￿
T; to 0.0055. This approximately matches the
share of Mexican exports and imports to and from the U.S. in Mexico￿ s GDP (i.e. 18% and 14%,
respectively) and the share of intermediate goods produced in the U.S. that are exported to
Mexico. Speci￿cally, Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2007) estimate that approximately
20 percent of U.S. durable manufacturing plants export. However, these plants produce a
much larger share of products than non-exporters. As a result, the share of intermediate
goods exported should also be signi￿cantly larger. We target a value of 33% for the share of
intermediate goods produced in the U.S. that are exported. This yields an average di⁄usion
lag to Mexico of 11 years, which seems reasonable given the evidence (e.g. Comin and Hobijn,
2010).
Das, Roberts and Tybout (2007) have estimated that the sunk cost of exporting for Colom-
bian manufacturing plants represents between 20 and 40 percent of their annual revenues from
exporting. We set the elasticity of ￿
g with respect to investments in exporting, ￿g; to 0.85
so that the sunk cost of exporting represents approximately 30 percent of the revenues from
exporting. The elasticity of ￿
T with respect to FDI expenses, ￿T; together with the steady
state value of ￿
T; determine the share of U.S. FDI in Mexico in steady state. We set ￿T to 0.5
so that U.S. FDI in Mexico represents approximately 2% of Mexican GDP.
4.2 Impulse response functions
To be clear, the exercises that follow are meant simply as a ￿rst pass at exploring whether
the mechanisms we emphasize have potential for explaining the data: They are not formal
statistical tests. For simplicity, the only two shocks we consider are innovations to the wage
12Interestingly, the value of   required to match the trade ￿ ows between the US and Mexico is smaller than
the values used in the literature (e.g. 1/1.2 in Corsetti et al., 2008) because of the closeness of Mexico and the
US and their lower (nonexistent after 1994) trade barriers.
20markup, ￿w
ct, in N (U.S.) and in S (Mexico): Several authors13 have argued that these shocks
may capture important drivers of business cycles. However, we show that the ￿ndings are
robust to other relevant shocks such as shocks to TFP and to the relative price of capital.
Response to a U.S. Shock.￿Figure 2 displays the impulse response functions to a U.S. wage
markup shock. Solid lines are used for the responses in Mexico while dashed lines represent
the responses in the U.S. The response of the U.S. economy to a domestic shock is very similar
to the single-country version presented in Comin and Gertler (2006). In particular, a positive
wage markup shock contracts domestic labor supply (panel 2) causing a recession (panel 1).
In addition to the decline in hours worked, the initial decline in U.S. output is driven by
exit in the ￿nal goods sector and by a decline in the utilization rate. The response of U.S.
output to the shock is more persistent than the shock itself (panel 12) due to the endogenous
propagation mechanisms of the model. In particular, the domestic recession reduces the demand
for intermediate goods and, hence, the return to R&D investments. This leads to a temporary
decline in the rate of development of new technologies but to a permanent e⁄ect on the level of
new technologies relative to trend. The long run e⁄ect of the shock on output is approximately
50% of its initial response.14
The U.S. shock has important e⁄ects on Mexico￿ s economy. Upon impact, the decline in
Mexico￿ s output is as large as the decline in U.S. output. Mexico￿ s recession is driven by two
forces: the decline in the demand for Mexican exports to the U.S. (panel 10) and the collapse
of Mexico￿ s investment (panel 4).
Unlike the U.S., the response of Mexico￿ s output to a U.S. shock is hump-shaped. At the
root of this response we ￿nd the dynamics of international technology di⁄usion. In particular,
the shock to ￿w
Nt reduces the return on exporting new intermediate goods and transferring their
production to Mexico. As a result, fewer resources are devoted to these investments (panel 7)
gradually reducing the stock of intermediate goods in Mexico relative to the steady state (panel
8). Since productivity is determined by the stock of intermediate goods, the slow international
di⁄usion of new technologies also leads to a gradual decline in Mexican productivity which
13E.g. Hall (1997), Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2002).
14In this version of the model, U.S. consumption responds more than U.S. output to a U.S. shock. As shown
in Comin and Santacreu (2010), this is a consequence of the simplifying assumption that new technologies
di⁄use immediately in the U.S. When that is the case, U.S. shocks have large e⁄ects on U.S. permament income
leading to large ￿ uctuations in consumption. The introduction of a slow di⁄usion process as in Comin and
Gertler (2006) or Comin and Santacreu (2010) ￿xes this counter-factual implication. The excess volatility of
U.S. consumption does not a⁄ect signi￿cantly the business cycle dynamics in Mexico.
21causes the hump-shaped response of output.15
Our model generates large ￿ uctuations in Mexico￿ s productivity. This is at the root of why
U.S. shocks have larger e⁄ects on Mexico￿ s output than in the U.S. itself. Intuitively, the slow
pace of international di⁄usion of intermediate goods generates a large gap between the stock of
technologies available for production in the U.S. and Mexico. As a result, when a shock a⁄ects
the return to exporting new technologies to Mexico, it induces very wide ￿ uctuations in the
￿ ow of new technologies exported to Mexico resulting in wide swings, over the medium term,
in the stock of technologies in Mexico. In the U.S., in contrast, there is no such a large stock
of technologies waiting to be adopted. Thus, the ￿ uctuations in the stock of technologies and
productivity are signi￿cantly smaller than in Mexico.
To illustrate further the role of the international di⁄usion of technologies in Mexico￿ s output
dynamics, Figure 3 plots the impulse response function to a shock to ￿w
Nt after shutting down
the extensive margin of trade and FDI channels. When eliminating these linkages between
the U.S. and Mexico, the e⁄ect of the shock on Mexico￿ s economy is much smaller. Mexico￿ s
GDP now declines by about one ￿fth of the decline in the model with endogenous technology
di⁄usion. Further, the response of Mexico￿ s output diminishes monotonically and it is less
persistent than the response of U.S. output.
In contrast, in our model, the response of Mexico￿ s output to a U.S. shock is more persistent
than the U.S. response and much more persistent than the shock itself. Thus, endogenous
international technology di⁄usion can provide a microfoundation for the ￿nding of Aguiar and
Gopinath (2007) that (in a reduced form speci￿cation) the shocks faced by developing countries
are more persistent than those faced by developed economies.
The gradual decline in ASt slowly reduces the e¢ ciency of production of new capital leading
to a gradual increase in the price of capital (panel 6). The initial response of Mexico￿ s investment
to these prospects for the price of capital largely depends on the magnitude of the adjustment
costs. Figure 4 reports the impulse response functions to a contractionary ￿w
Nt shock with
no adjustment costs. In the absence of adjustment costs, ￿rms want to time the decline in
investment with the peak in the price of new capital. As a result investment does not decline
initially but declines sharply later on.
In the presence of adjustment costs, it is very costly to follow this strategy and companies
start reducing their investment when the shock hits the economy in anticipation of the future
15In the US the response to the shock is monotonic because of the larger e⁄ect of the shock on domestic
demand and because technology di⁄uses faster domestically than internationally.
22increase in the price of capital. As a result, a contractionary U.S. shock generates a collapse
of Mexico￿ s investment upon impact (panel 4 of Figure 2) which continues to decline as the
price of capital increases and the economy contracts further. As we shall show below, the data
supports the model￿ s prediction of a strong co-movement between U.S. output and Mexico￿ s
investment.
The response of investment to U.S. shocks signi￿cantly ampli￿es the initial response of
Mexico￿ s output to the U.S. shock. (See Figures 2 and 4.) In the absence of adjustment costs,
Mexico￿ s investment does not decline when the shock hits the economy and the only force that
drives Mexico￿ s recession is the decline in demand for Mexican exports to the U.S. Since the
share of exports in Mexican GDP is not that large, Mexico￿ s output declines only by 0.025% in
response to a 1% increase in ￿w
Nt: With adjustment costs, the collapse of investment contributes
to Mexico￿ s recession and output declines by 0.45% in response to the same shock. However,
note that in both cases the decline in Mexico￿ s output eventually exceeds the size of the recession
generated in the U.S. Similarly, the hump-shaped response of Mexico￿ s output is independent
of the calibration of the adjustment costs.
Response to a Mexican Shock￿Figure 5 displays the impulse response functions to a Mexican
wage markup shock (￿w
St) in the U.S. (dashed) and in Mexico (solid). There are some striking
di⁄erences with Figure 2. First, a Mexican shock has virtually no e⁄ect in the U.S. This follows
from the di⁄erence in size between the two economies but also from the fact that technologies
￿ ow from the U.S. to Mexico and not otherwise. One consequence of this is that the Mexican
shock has a smaller e⁄ect than the U.S. shock on the extensive margin of trade and FDI. As a
result, the e⁄ect of ￿w
St on Mexico￿ s GDP is more transitory than the e⁄ect of a U.S. shock.
However, the most signi￿cant observation from Figure 5 is that Mexican shocks have a larger
e⁄ect on Mexico￿ s consumption than on output. This is the result of both the endogenous
relative price of capital and the adjustment costs. We explain next the intuition for this result.
By the logic explained above, a contractionary shock leads to a gradual increase in the price
of capital. The prospect of a future higher price of capital has two e⁄ects. On the one hand,
it prevents investment from falling too much initially. (This is also achieved by the adjustment
costs. See the contrast with the impulse response to a Mexican shock in the model without
adjustment costs in Figure A1.)16 On the other, it raises current and future interest rates
16Adjustment costs smooth the initial response of Mexico￿ s investment to the domestic shock. This has two
e⁄ects. On the one hand, it absorbs resources forcing consumption to decline. On the other, it increases the
persistence of the e⁄ects of the shocks, amplifying the decline in capital gains from exporting and conducting
23despite the lower marginal product of capital due to the recession. Current and future high
interest rates induce consumers to save more today, hence reducing their consumption.
Such a signi￿cant decline in Mexico￿ s consumption is feasible for two reasons. First, invest-
ment does not fall too much initially. Second, consistent with the data, the trade balance is
very counter-cyclical. This, in turn, is a consequence of the persistent response of investment to
the shock. Because the response of Mexico￿ s investment is so persistent, the value of transfer-
ring the production of intermediate goods to Mexico, vT; declines more than net income from
transferred technologies, ￿T (panel 9). This leads to a signi￿cant decline in FDI in￿ ows into
Mexico, a phenomenon that has motivated the ￿sudden stops￿literature (e.g. Calvo, 1998). To
reestablish the international equilibrium, the peso depreciates, leading to a trade surplus that
absorbs resources and forcing Mexico￿ s consumption to fall.17
Note that one of the key drivers of the high volatility of consumption in Mexico is the
counter-cyclicality of the price of capital. As we show below, this prediction is borne by the
data. The price of new capital in Mexico is very counter-cyclical at the high frequency with a
correlation between HP-￿ltered output and HP-￿ltered price of capital of -0.55.18 Interestingly,
the price of new capital is signi￿cantly more counter-cyclical in Mexico than in the U.S., where
the equivalent correlation is -0.08. This may explain why consumption is as volatile as GDP in
Mexico but not in the U.S.
Comparing Figures 2 and 5, it is clear that the high relative volatility of consumption in Mex-
ico is driven by Mexican shocks rather than by U.S. shocks. This is the case because Mexican
shocks have a much larger e⁄ect on Mexico￿ s interest rates than U.S. shocks. Intuitively, U.S.
shocks trigger a more persistent decline in Mexico￿ s output than Mexican shocks. As a result,
Mexican companies want to cut their investment more drastically in response to them. This
leads to a larger initial increase in the price of installed capital (P I
S) which reduces the increase
in the slope of P I
S due to the gradual increase in the price of new capital (P K
S ).19 Hence the
FDI to Mexico. As a result, the price of capital in Mexico ￿ uctuates more generating a larger appreciation in
Mexico￿ s price of capital which leads to higher interest rates in response to the shock.
17The strong counter-cyclical current account is documented by Neumeyer and Perri (2005) in a sample of
developing countries (which includes Mexico).
18The counter-cyclicality of the price of new capital in Mexico is robust to other ￿ltering methods. For
example, the correlation between the growth rate in the price of capital and HP-￿ltered output is -0.65. Over
the medium term cycle the correlation between Mexico￿ s price of capital and GDP is -0.71. In the U.S., the
correlation between these variables over the medium term is -0.55. For the full post-war period, the correlations
in the U.S. are slightly larger (in absolute value): -0.18 for HP-￿ltered data and -0.66 over the medium term.
19As discussed above, a decline in investment leads to an increase in the price of installed capital because the
24lower increase in interest rates following a recessionary shock in the U.S. than one in Mexico.
4.3 Simulations
We next turn to the quantitative evaluation of the model. To this end, we calibrate the volatility
and persistence of wage markups shocks in the U.S. and Mexico and run 1000 simulations over
a 17-year long horizon each. Since we intend to evaluate the model￿ s ability to propagate
shocks both internationally and over time, we use the same autocorrelation for both U.S. and
Mexican shocks and set the cross-country correlation of the shocks to zero. We set the annual
autocorrelation of markup shocks to 0.6 to match the persistence of markups in the U.S.20
We calibrate the volatility of the shocks by forcing the model to approximately match the
high frequency standard deviation of GDP in Mexico and the U.S. This yields a volatility of
the wage markup shock of 3.53% in the U.S. and 4.59% in Mexico. This is consistent with the
suspicion that developing economies are prone to bigger disturbances than developed countries.
Volatility.￿Table 1 compares the standard deviations of the high frequency and medium
term cycle ￿ uctuations in the data and in the model. Our calibration strategy forces the model
to match the volatilities of output in Mexico and the U.S. at the high frequency. In addition,
the model also comes very close to matching the volatility of output over the medium term both
in Mexico (0.04 vs. 0.037 in the data) and in the U.S. (0.026 vs. 0.015 in the data). Given the
low persistence of shocks, matching these moments suggests that the model induces the right
amount of propagation of high frequency shocks into the medium term.
The model does a good job in reproducing the volatility observed in the data in variables
other than output. It does a remarkable job in matching the volatility of Mexico￿ s consumption
both at the high frequency (0.031 vs. 0.031 in the data) and over the medium term cycle (0.044
vs. 0.04 in the data). This is of special interest given the attention that the international macro
literature has given to these moments.
The model also generates series for investment, the relative price of capital, bilateral trade
￿ ows, the extensive margin of trade and FDI ￿ ows that have similar volatilities to those observed
adjustment costs embedded in (25) imply that lower levels of investment today increase the costs of investment
tomorrow.
20See Comin and Gertler (2006) for details. Note that, because of the propagation obtained from the endoge-
nous technology mechanisms, this class of models requires a smaller autocorrelation of the shocks to match the
persistence in macro variables. In short, they are not a⁄ected by the Cogley and Nason (1995) criticism that
the Neoclassical growth model does not propagate exogenous disturbances.
25in the data both at the high frequency and medium term. For those instances where there are
some di⁄erences, the empirical volatilities tend to fall within the 95% con￿dence interval for
the standard deviation of the simulated series.21
Co-movement.￿Most international business cycle models have problems reproducing the
cross-country co-movement patterns observed in macro variables. First, they lack international
propagation mechanisms that induce a strong positive co-movement in output. Second, they
tend to generate a stronger cross-country co-movement in consumption than in output, while
in the data we observe the opposite (Backus, Kehoe and Kydland, 1992).22
Our model fares well in both of these dimensions. Panel A of Table 4 reports the cross
country correlations between Mexico and the U.S. for consumption and output, both in the
model and in the data. The model generates the strong co-movement between U.S. and Mexico
GDPs observed in the data. The average cross-country correlation in our simulations is 0.68
with a con￿dence interval of (0.3 , 0.89) that contains the correlation observed in the data
(0.43). The model also generates a smaller cross-country correlation for consumption than for
output, as we observe in the data: The average cross-correlation is 0.055 with a con￿dence
interval that contains the empirical correlation (0.2).23
Our model￿ s ability to match the empirical cross-country co-movement patterns resides in the
combination of endogenous di⁄usion and ￿ ow investment adjustment costs. The endogenous
international di⁄usion of technologies generates a strong cross-country co-movement in output
and productivity over the medium term. Because of adjustment costs, Mexican ￿rms respond to
the future productivity path by adjusting their investment contemporaneously in a pro-cyclical
way. This induces the cross-country correlation in output and investment. The large e⁄ect
that foreign shocks have on domestic investment limits the possibility for a large consumption
response, hence inducing a higher cross-country correlation in output than in consumption.
Panel B of Table 4 reports the contemporaneous correlation between the HP-￿ltered Mexican
21One exception is the growth in the number of intermediate goods exported from the U.S. to Mexico, where
our model generates less volatility than we observe in the data counterpart of this variable.
22Several authors, including Baxter and Crucini (1995) and Kollmann (1996), have shown that reducing the
completeness of international ￿nancial markets is not su¢ cient to match the data along these dimensions. Kehoe
and Perri (2002) have made signi￿cant progress by introducing enforcement contraints on ￿nancial contracts.
This mechanism limits the amount of risk sharing, reducing consumption co-movement and increasing the
cross-country co-movement in output. However, output still co-moves signi￿cantly less than in the data.
23The international business cycle literature has also found it di¢ cult to generate positive cross-correlations
in investment and employment (Baxter, 1995). As it is clear from Figure 2, our model delivers both.
26variables and HP-￿ltered output in both Mexico and the U.S.24 Broadly speaking, the model
does a very good job in capturing the contemporaneous co-movement patterns within Mexico
but also between Mexico and the U.S. The model generates the observed correlation between
consumption and output in Mexico (0.61 vs. 0.78 in the data). Note also that, in both model
and data, Mexico￿ s consumption is insigni￿cantly correlated with U.S. GDP. This indicates that
U.S. shocks do not contribute to the high volatility of Mexico￿ s consumption. This instead is
the result of the response of Mexico￿ s consumption to domestic shocks.
A key driver of the volatility of consumption is the dynamics of the price of capital induced
by domestic shocks. It is reassuring that the model matches the negative co-movement between
Mexico￿ s output and the price of new capital (-0.36 vs. -0.54 in the data). Note also that the
model generates an insigni￿cant contemporaneous co-movement between the price of capital in
Mexico and U.S. GDP, which is consistent with the evidence (-0.08 in model vs. 0.13 in data).
As we show below, this is the case because U.S. shocks drive the price of new capital over the
medium term but not so much contemporaneously.
Recall that the strong co-movement between U.S. output and Mexico￿ s investment is the key
driver of the large e⁄ect that U.S. shocks have on Mexico￿ s GDP. The model also captures the
strong co-movement between Mexican investment and output in both the U.S. (0.77 vs. 0.6 in
the data) and Mexico (0.69 vs. 0.62 in the data).
Similarly, recall that the medium term productivity dynamics in Mexico result from the
cyclicality of the ￿ ow of intermediate goods that di⁄use to Mexico (i.e. the extensive margin of
trade). The model matches quite closely the correlation between our data-counterpart for this
variable and output in both the U.S. (0.42 vs. 0.28 in the data) and in Mexico (0.43 vs. 0.42
in the data).
The model also captures broadly the cyclicality of the bilateral trade ￿ ows. In particular,
the model generates the strong counter-cyclicality of Mexico￿ s trade balance. The correlation
between Mexico￿ s trade balance and GDP is -0.96 vs. -0.83 in the data. This is the case because,
both in the data and in our model, imports from the U.S. co-move more with Mexico￿ s GDP
than exports to the U.S. The model also captures the high correlation of bilateral trade ￿ ows
with U.S. GDP.
A variable where the model underperforms is FDI. Though the model matches cyclicality of
FDI in the data, the correlations with both U.S. and Mexico￿ s GDP are too high. This may
re￿ ect the presence of a small but volatile component in actual FDI that does not respond to
24Note that we do not ￿lter the growth rate of intermediate goods since this variable is already trend stationary.
27the U.S. or Mexican business cycle.
Inter-frequency Co-movement.￿One of the motivations for our model was the observation
that U.S. high frequency ￿ uctuations lead medium term ￿ uctuations in Mexico. The impulse
response functions to U.S. shocks (see Figure 2) show that, qualitatively, the model is able
to generate these persistent e⁄ects. Table 5 explores the quantitative power of the model to
reproduce the inter-frequency co-movement patterns we observe in the data. The ￿rst row
of Table 5 reports the empirical correlation between lagged HP-￿ltered U.S. output and the
medium term component of Mexico￿ s output. The second row reports the average of these
statistics across 1000 simulations of the model.
The model roughly captures the contemporaneous correlation between high frequency ￿ uc-
tuations in U.S. output and medium term ￿ uctuations in Mexico￿ s output (0.37 in the model
vs. 0.28 in the data). More importantly, the model generates a hump-shaped cross-correlogram
between these two variables as we observed in the data. However, in the data the peak cor-
relation occurs after two years (0.53), while in the model it occurs on average after one year
(0.42).
A key prediction of our model is that the high frequency response of the extensive margin
of trade to U.S. shocks generates counter-cyclical ￿ uctuations in the relative price of capital
in Mexico over the medium term. The fourth row in Table 5 presents the average correlation
across our 1000 simulations between the medium term component of Mexico￿ s relative price of
capital and HP-￿ltered U.S. output at various lags. In both actual and simulated data, the
contemporaneous correlation is insigni￿cant. The correlation becomes more negative as we lag
U.S. GDP in both cases. In the simulated data the peak (in absolute terms) is reached after
two years (-0.38), while in the actual data it is reached after three years (-0.5).
Unlike U.S. shocks, Mexican shocks do not have a hump-shaped e⁄ect on Mexico￿ s output
over the medium term ￿ uctuations. The correlation between HP-￿ltered and the medium term
component of Mexico￿ s output is positive and declines monotonically as we lag the series of
HP-￿ltered output.25 Our model is consistent with this co-movement pattern. (See rows 5 and
6 in Table 5.)
25In the working paper version, we make a similar point by estimating VARs with HP-￿ltered Mexico￿ s GDP
and the medium term component of several Mexican variables (including GDP).
285 Discussion
Next, we explore in more detail the implications of our model and compare it to existing models
of trade and international business cycles.
Other Shocks.￿For concreteness, we have used wage markup shocks as the sole source of
￿ uctuations in our simulations. However, our ￿ndings are not driven by the nature of the
shocks. To illustrate this, we introduce shocks to TFP and to the price of investment. Figure 6
presents the impulse response functions to a (negative) TFP shock (second row) and a (positive)
shock to the price of investment (third row) both in the U.S. To facilitate the comparison, the
impulse response function to the U.S. wage markup shock is presented in the ￿rst row of the
￿gure.
Qualitatively, the impulse response functions to these shocks are very similar. In all of them
there is a large e⁄ect upon the impact of the U.S. shock on Mexican output, though the initial
response for the two new shocks is smaller in Mexico than in the U.S. All shocks generate a
hump-shaped response of Mexico￿ s output. And in all three cases, the U.S. shock eventually has
a larger e⁄ect on Mexico than in the U.S. The economics of the response are the same as in the
wage markup shock described above. All three shocks trigger a large and persistent slowdown in
the ￿ ow of new technologies to Mexico and an initial decline in Mexico￿ s investment larger than
the initial decline in consumption. As the productivity of the capital goods sector deteriorates
relative to trend, investment declines further generating the hump in the output response.
The response to Mexican shocks is also robust to the nature of the shocks (see Figure 7).
For the three Mexican shocks, Mexico￿ s consumption responds initially more than output and
the response of investment is hump-shaped. The similarity of the impulse responses across the
three types of shocks suggests that a richer calibration that allowed for a broader set of shocks
would capture as well as our simulations the cyclical properties of the Mexican economy and
the co-movement patterns with the U.S.
Sunk vs. Fixed Exporting Costs.￿Much of the theoretical international macro literature that
has incorporated the extensive margin of trade has relied on extensions of the Melitz (2003)
model. The Melitz model is a two country model with ￿rms of heterogenous productivity and
where ￿rms have to incur in some costs to export. Unlike our model, most of the models that
have used the Melitz framework to explore business cycle dynamics use ￿xed cost instead of
sunk cost to adjust the range of intermediate goods available for production.
The empirical literature on ￿rm dynamics and exports has found that there are large sunk
29costs of exporting new products (e.g. Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Das et al., 2007). However,
the use of ￿xed costs could be defended on the grounds of their tractability if the model with
￿xed costs has propagation and ampli￿cation power similar to that of the model with sunk costs
of exporting. To explore whether this is the case, we develop a version of our model where,
to export intermediate goods, ￿rms in N now just need to incur a per period ￿xed cost. For
consistency, we also make the investment in transferring production from N to S a ￿xed cost.
Other than these two changes, this version of the model is identical to our original model. This
model is basically a variation on the ￿nancial autarky model in Ghironi and Melitz (2005) with
physical capital and without heterogeneity. We calibrate the ￿xed costs of exporting and FDI
so that in steady state the trade ￿ ows are the same as in our original model.
Figure 8 plots the impulse response functions to a U.S. wage markup shock in the model
with ￿xed costs. The di⁄erences with our original model are remarkable. In the model with
￿xed costs of exporting, a contractionary U.S. shock causes a much smaller decline in Mexico￿ s
output - only 30% of the decline in U.S. output - than in our model.26 This is the case because
in the model with ￿xed cost of exporting, the ￿ ow of exported and transferred intermediate
goods adjusts in response to ￿ uctuations in current pro￿ts. In the model with sunk costs, the
￿ ow of technologies adjusts in response to ￿ uctuations in the present discounted value of pro￿ts.
Given the high persistence of pro￿ts, the present discounted value of pro￿ts ￿ uctuates more and
more persistently than current pro￿ts. As a result, the range of intermediate goods declines
by more over the medium term, generating larger increases in the relative price of capital and
larger declines in investment.
The larger drop in U.S. than in Mexico￿ s investment reduces the relative demand for inter-
mediate goods produced in Mexico. To reestablish the international equilibrium, the peso needs
to depreciate. The depreciation of the peso, together with Mexico￿ s recession, causes a large
drop in FDI and in the number of intermediate goods produced in Mexico. This is precisely the
mechanism used in Bergin et al. (2009) to explain the higher volatility of o⁄-shored industries
in Mexico than in the U.S. observed in the data.27
Implications for Aggregate Volatility.￿It is clear from Figure 2 that U.S. shocks are a signif-
26This magnitude is consistent with the ￿ndings in Ghironi and Melitz (2005).
27A di⁄erent approach to modeling production sharing is followed by Burnstein, Kurz and Tesar (2008).
Rather than using variation in the extensive margin, their model assumes a complementarity between domestic
and foreign intermediate goods in U.S. production. By changing the importance of the sector where domestic
and foreign intermediate goods are complementary, they can generate a signi￿cant increase in the correlation
between U.S. and Mexican manufacturing output.
30icant source of volatility in Mexico￿ s GDP. But what share of Mexican ￿ uctuations is due to
U.S. shocks and what share is due to domestic shocks? Similarly, how much do Mexican shocks
contribute to the volatility of U.S. GDP?
Table 6 answers these questions by reporting the share of output volatility in each country
attributable to each kind of shock. The ￿rst two columns focus on the volatility of HP-￿ltered
output while the next two focus on the volatility of output over the medium term cycle. Con-
sistent with Figure 5, Mexican shocks account for a small fraction of U.S. ￿ uctuations (3% at
high frequency and 2% over the medium term cycle).
In contrast, U.S. shocks represent a very signi￿cant source of Mexican ￿ uctuations. At
the high frequency, 64% of Mexico￿ s GDP volatility is driven by U.S. shocks, while over the
medium term cycle, U.S. shocks induce 66% of the volatility in Mexico￿ s GDP. This proves the
importance of explicitly modelling the U.S. economy to study the business and medium term
cycles of the Mexican economy.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have developed an asymmetric two-country model to study business cycle
￿ uctuations in developing countries. The model introduces two key elements: (i) endogenous
and slow di⁄usion of technologies from the developed to the developing country, and (ii) ￿ ow
adjustment costs to investment. These mechanisms yield three predictions that we observe in
Mexican business cycles.
First, U.S. shocks have a larger e⁄ect on Mexico￿ s than on U.S. GDP. Second, the slow
di⁄usion of technologies to Mexico generates a hump-shaped response in Mexican output to
U.S. shocks. Third, Mexico￿ s consumption is more volatile than output.
Previous research has already shown that some of these predictions are stylized facts of
business ￿ uctuations in developing countries. Thus, our model can be a useful starting point
for obtaining a better understanding of business cycle ￿ uctuations in developing countries in
general. In doing so, it may be helpful to introduce other relevant linkages not present in our
model such as remittances or international capital ￿ ows other than FDI.
One of the key contributions of this paper is to extend the business cycle models of endoge-
nous technology (e.g. Comin and Gertler, 2006) to two-country settings. There are several
alternative con￿gurations of the two countries that are worth pursuing. One natural variation
is to model both countries as advanced economies that develop new technologies through R&D
31and adopt each other￿ s technologies. This con￿guration would naturally capture the interac-
tions between the U.S. and the EU, or the U.S. and Japan. A second variation could be to keep
the asymmetry between the developed and developing countries but introduce a low frequency
transition by the developing country to its balanced growth path. This con￿guration would
allow to analyze the interdependence between the U.S. and China at the high and medium term
frequencies.
32References
[1] Aguiar, M. and G. Gopinath (2007): ￿Emerging Market Business cycle: The Trend is The
Cycle￿Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 115: 69-102.
[2] Basu, S., and J. Fernald (1997). ￿Returns to Scale in U.S. Production: Estimates and
Implications,￿Journal of Political Economy Vol. 105, No. 2: 249-283.
[3] Baxter, M. (1995). ￿International Trade and Business Cycles￿Handbook of International
Economics, G. Grossman and K. Rogo⁄ (eds.), Vol. 3 (Amsterdam: Noth-Holland), p.
1901-1864.
[4] Bergin, P., R. Feenstra, G. Hanson (2009). ￿Volatility Due to O⁄shoring: Theory and
Evidence￿mimeo U.C. Davis.
[5] Bernard, A., B. Jensen, S. Redding and P. Schott (2007). ￿Firms and International Trade￿
mimeo.
[6] Blanchard, O. and J. Gali (2007): ￿The Macroeconomic E⁄ect of Oil Shocks: Why are the
2000s So Di⁄erent from the 1970s?￿NBER wp #13368.
[7] Burnstein, A., C. Kurz, and L. Tesar (2008): ￿Trade, Production Sharing and the Inter-
national Transmission of Business Cycles￿Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 55, No.
4: 775-795.
[8] Caballero, R., and A. Ja⁄e (1993). ￿How High are the Giants￿Shoulders: An Empirical
Assessment of Knowledge Spillovers and Creative Destruction in a Model of Economic
Growth,￿NBER Macroeconomics Annual, O. J. Blanchard and S. Fischer editors, MIT
press, p. 15-72.
[9] Calvo, G. (1998). ￿Capital Flows and Capital-Market Crises: The Simple Economics of
Sudden Stops,￿Journal of Applied Economics Vol. 1, No. 1: 35-54.
[10] Comin, D. (2007). ￿On the Integration of Growth and Business Cycles,￿Empirica, Vol.
36, No. 2(May).
[11] Comin, D. and M. Gertler (2006). ￿Medium-Term Business Cycles,￿American Economic
Review Vol. 96, No. 3: 523-551.
33[12] Comin, D., M. Gertler and A. M. Santancreu (2008), ￿Innovations in Growth Potential as
Sources of Output and Asset Price Fluctuations" mimeo.
[13] Das, S., M. Roberts and J. Tybout (2007). ￿Market entry Costs, Producer Heterogeneity
and Export Dynamics￿Econometrica, Vol. 75, No. 3 (May): 837-873.
[14] Gelos, R. G. and A. Isgut (2001). ￿Fixed Capital Adjustment: Is Latin America Di⁄erent?￿
The Review of Economics and Statistics Vol. 83, No. 4: 717-26.
[15] Gali, J., M. Gertler and D. Lopez-Salido (2007), ￿Markups, Gaps, and the Welfare Cost of
Economic Fluctuations￿ , Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 89 (February):. 44-59.
[16] Ghironi, F., and M. Melitz (2005). ￿International Trade and Macroeconomic Dynamics
with Heterogeneous Firms￿Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 120, No. 3: 865-915.
[17] Greenwood, J., Z. Hercowitz and G. W. Hu⁄man (1988). ￿Investment, Capacity Utiliza-
tion, and the Real Business Cycle,￿The American Economic Review Vol. 78, No. 3: 402-
417.
[18] Greenwood, J., Z. Hercowitz and P. Krusell (2000). ￿The role of investment-speci￿c tech-
nological change in the business cycle,￿European Economic Review Vol. 44, No. 1: 91-115.
[19] Gwartney, James, and Robert Lawson, with Russell S. Sobel and Peter T. Leeson. (2007).
Economic Freedom of the World: 2007 Annual Report. The Fraser Institute.
[20] Iscan, T. (2000). ￿Financial Constraints and Investment Decline in Mexico.￿The Manu-
facture School Vol. 68, No. 1 (January): 24-43.
[21] Iyer, L. (2003). ￿NAFTA: To Trade or not To Trade,￿HBS case #9-705-034.
[22] Kehoe, P. and F. Perri (2002). ￿International Business Cycles With Endogenous Incomplete
Markets,￿Econometrica. Vol. 70, No. 3: 907-928, May.
[23] Loayza, N. and L. Serven (2006). ￿Capital ￿ ows to Developing Countries: The Old and
The New￿mimeo.
[24] Mendoza, E. (2008). ￿Sudden Stops, Financial Crises and Leverage: A Fisherian De￿ ation
of Tobin￿ s Q￿The American Economic Review (forthcoming).
34[25] Miller, Terry, and Kim R. Holmes. (2009). 2009 Index of Economic Freedom. The Heritage
Foundation and The Wall Street Journal. http://www.heritage.org/Index/
[26] Neumeyer, P. and F. Perri (2005). ￿Business Cycles in Emerging Economies: The Role of
Interest Rates," Journal of Monetary Economics Vol. 52, No. 2: pp. 345-380.
[27] Pakes, A. and M. Schankerman (1984). ￿The Rate of Obsolescence of Knowledge, Research
gestation Lags, and the Private Rate of Return to Research Resources￿p. 73-88, in Z.
Griliches (Ed.), Patents, R&D and Productivity, The University of Chicago Press.
[28] Romer, Paul M.(1990). ￿Endogenous Technological Change,￿Journal of Political Economy
Vol. 98, No.5: 71-102
[29] Stokey, Nancy (1991). ￿The Volume and Composition of Trade between Rich and Poor
Countries￿Review of Economic Studies Vol. 58, No. 1: 63-80, January.
[30] Vernon, Raymond (1966). ￿International Investment and International Trade in the Prod-
uct Cycle,￿The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol.80, No. 2: 190-207.
[31] Warner, A. (1992). ￿Did the Debt Crisis Cause the Investment Crisis?￿ The Quarterly
Journal of Economics Vol.107, No. 4 (November), 1161-1186.
[32] Warner, A. (1994). ￿Mexico￿ s Investment Collapse: or Oil?￿ Journal of International
Money and Finance Vol.13, No. 2: 239-256.
[33] Wells, L.T. Jr (1972). ￿International Trade: The Product Life Cycle Approach, ￿ in Wells,
L.T. Jr (Eds), The Product Life Cycle and International Trade, Harvard University.
























1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006




































S Xg, Xt 
2





AL, Ag, AT 
3






T and VT 
4



















Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions for U.S.Wage Markup Shock, 
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Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions for U.S. Wage Markup Shock, Model Without
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Figure 4: Impulse Response Functions for U.S. Wage Markup Shock, Model Without
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Figure 5: Impulse Response Functions for Mexico Wage Markup Shock, 
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Figure 6: Impulse Response Functions for U.S. Wage Markup,TFP and Price of Investment Shocks, 
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Figure 7: Impulse Response Functions for Mexico Wage Markup,TFP and Price of Investment Shocks, 
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Figure 8: Impulse Response Functions for U.S. Wage Markup Shock in Model with Fixed Costs of
                 International Technology Diffusion. (US dash, Mexico solid)Table 1A: Relationship between HP U.S. GDP and medium term component of Mexican GDP and relative 
price of capital 
                          
U.S. GDP HP‐filtered 
Lags  0 1  2  3 
Mexican GDP  0.28 0.49*  0.53**  0.39 
Mexican relative price of capital  0.35 0.02  -0.24  -0.5*** 





                    
U.S. GDP (HP filtered)  Mexico GDP (HP filtered) 
Growth rate varieties imported from U.S.  0.28 0.42 
Varieties imported from U.S. (HP‐filtered)  0.58*** 0.92*** 
Varieties imported from U.S. (Medium term 
business cycle)  0.68*** 0.86*** 





                          
Durable manufacturing varieties imported from U.S.  
Lags  0 1  2  3 
Mexican GDP  0.30 0.44*  0.50**  0.49* 
Mexican relative price of capital  0.37 -0.01  -0.38  -0.68*** 




￿ Discount factor 0.95
￿ Depreciation rate 0.1
GN=YN Share of Government Spending 0.2
GS=YS Share of Government Spending 0.1
U Capacity utilization rate in steady state 0.8
￿
00(U) ￿ U=￿
0(U) Elasticity of depreciation w.r.t. U 0.15
￿ Labor supply elasticity 1
￿c Markup ￿nal goods 1.1
￿k Markup capital goods 1.15
LN=LS Relative labor supply 3
Z0N=Z0S Exogenous relative TFP N ￿ S 3.35
￿ Survival probability 0.9
bc Operating cost parameter 0.05
bk
c Operating cost parameter 0.016
g Growth rate of TFP 0.0072
￿ R&D productivity 2.69
￿ Markup intermediate goods 1.5
￿ Elasticity of R&D 0.65
￿
00
N(1) Adjustment costs 1
￿
00
S(1) Adjustment costs 1.5
  Iceberg transport costs 0.95
￿
g Probability of international di⁄usion in steady state 0.0875
￿
T Probability of production transfer in steady state 0.0055
￿g Elasticity of international di⁄usion 0.8
￿T Elasticity of production transfer 0.5
38Table 3 : Volatility Model vs. Data 
                 
High Frequency  Medium term Cycle 
MEXICO  Data  Model     Data  Model 
GDP   0.026 0.024  0.037 0.04 
(0.014 , 0.037)  (0.019 , 0.07) 
CONSUMPTION  0.031 0.031  0.040  0.044 
(0.019, 0.046)  (0.024 , 0.074)  
INVESTMENT  0.079 0.068  0.082 0.12 
(0.03 , 0.12)  (0.05 , 0.23) 
RELATIVE PRICE OF 
CAPITAL  0.029 0.016  0.042  0.035 
(0.007, 0.028)  (0.013 , 0.067) 
IMPORTS (FROM US)  0.090 0.050  0.117  0.084 
(0.023 , 0.09)   (0.035 , 0.15) 
EXPORTS (TO US)  0.090 0.060  0.134  0.105 
(0.027 , 0.11)   (0.042 , 0.19) 
TRADE SUPLUS/GDP  0.014 0.020  0.026  0.026 





0.049 (all)  
0.047 (dur.) 
   0.019          
(0.01, 0.029) 
     
FDI/GDP  0.004 0.004  0.005  0.017 
(0.002 , 0.01)  (0.006, 0.044) 
                 
U.S. GDP  0.013 0.018  0.015  0.026 
  (0.01 , 0.027)  (0.013 , 0.044) 







                 
PANEL A: Cross‐country correlations between Mexico and U.S.       
Data  Model 
GDP  0.43*  0.68 
(0.31 , 0.89) 
CONSUMPTION  0.2 0.05 
(-0.54, 0.059) 
PANEL B: Correlation of Mexican Macro Variables with Mexican and U.S. GDP 
   GDP USA     GDP MEXICO 
Data  Model  Data  Model 
CONSUMPTION  0.02 0.06  0.78***  0.61 
(-0.54, 0.61)  (-0.01, 0.91) 
INVESTMENT  0.6*** 0.77  0.62*** 0.69 
(0.26, 0.91)  (0.23, 0.93) 
RELATIVE PRICE OF CAPITAL  0.13 -0.08  -0.54***  -0.36 
(-0.52, 0.4)  (-0.75 , 0.13) 
IMPORTS (FROM US)  0.61*** 0.85  0.83*** 0.74 
(0.73, 0.93)  (0.32, 0.93) 
EXPORTS (TO US)  0.68*** 0.70  0.08  0.57 
(0.37, 0.94)  (-0.03, 0.9) 
MEXICAN TRADE 
SURPLUS/GDP  0.07 -0.62  -0.83***  -0.96 











   0.43          
(-0.1, 0.78) 
FDI/GDP  0.23 0.89  0.11 0.73 
(0.66, 0.98)  (0.36, 0.92) 







                 
Lags of High Frequency US Output 
0  1  2  3 
MEDIUM TERM COMPONENT MEX 
GDP 
Data  0.28 0.49*  0.53**  0.39 
Model  0.37** 0.42**  0.35**  0.18 
MEDIUM TERM COMPONENT RELATIVE PRICE OF CAPITAL IN MEX  
Data  0.35 0.02  -0.24  -0.5** 
Model  -0.14 -0.30*  -0.38*  -0.35 
Lags of High Frequency MEX Output 
0  1  2  3 
MEDIUM TERM COMPONENT MEX 
GDP 
Data  0.45** 0.32 0.05  -0.16 
Model  0.52** 0.45** 0.25 -0.01 
MEDIUM TERM COMPONENT RELATIVE PRICE OF CAPITAL IN MEX  
Data  -0.13 -0.32  -0.34 -0.22 
Model  -0.33** -0.45**  -0.45**  -0.32 







                       
High Frequency  Medium Term Cycle 
US volatility  Mexican volatility  US volatility  Mexican volatility 
US Shocks  0.97 0.64  0.98  0.66 
Mexico Shocks  0.03 0.36  0.02  0.34 




In this appendix we describe the calibration of the twelve standard parameters and the six
parameters that relate to the R&D process. We set the discount factor ￿ equal to 0:95; to
match the steady state share of non-residential investment to output. Based on steady state
evidence we also choose the following numbers: (the capital share) ￿ = 0:33; (government
consumption to output) GN=YN = 0:2 and GS=YS = 0:1; (the depreciation rate) ￿ = 0:1; and
(the steady state utilization rate) U = 0:8; based on the average capacity utilization level in
the postwar period as measured by the Board of Governors. We set the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply ￿ at unity, which represents an intermediate value for the range of
estimates across the micro and macro literature. Similarly, we set the elasticity of the change in
the depreciation rate with respect to the utilization rate, (￿
00=￿
0)U; at 0:15, used, for example,
in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) and Comin, Gertler and Santacreu (2009). Finally, based on
evidence in Basu and Fernald (1997), we ￿x the steady state gross value added markup in the
consumption goods sector, ￿c; equal to 1:1 and the corresponding markup for the capital goods
sector, ￿k; at 1:15:
We set the population of the U.S. relative to Mexico to 3. Similarly, we set the relative
productivity levels in ￿nal goods production to 3.35 so that U.S. GDP is approximately 12
times Mexico￿ s GDP.
We next turn to the ￿non-standard￿parameters. The estimates for the obsolescence rate
have a range from the 4% per year in Caballero and Ja⁄e (1992) to around 20% in Pakes
and Schankerman (1984). Based on this range we consider an obsolescence rate of 10% which
implies a value for ￿ of 0.9. The steady state growth rates of GDP and the relative price of
capital in the model are functions of the growth rate of new technologies, which in our model are
used to produce new capital, and of the exogenous growth rate of disembodied productivity, g.
By using the balanced growth restrictions and matching the average growth rate of non-farm
business output per working age person (0.024) and the average growth rate of the Gordon
quality adjusted price of capital relative to the BEA price of consumption goods and services
(-0.026), we can identify the growth rate of disembodied productivity, g; and the productivity
parameters in the technologies for creating new intermediate goods, ￿: Accordingly, we set
g = 0:0072 and ￿ = 2:69.
There is no direct evidence on the gross markup # for specialized intermediate goods. Given
the specialized nature of these products, it seems that an appropriate number would be at the
36high range of the estimates of markups in the literature for other types of goods. Accordingly
we choose a value of 1:5, but emphasize that our results are robust to reasonable variations
around this number.
There is also no simple way to identify the elasticity of new intermediate goods with respect
to R&D, ￿. Griliches (1990) presents some estimates using the number of new patents as
a proxy for technological change. The estimates are noisy and range from about 0:6 to 1:0,
depending on the use of panel versus cross-sectional data. We opt for a conservative value of
0.65, in the lower range. The calibrations of #; ￿; ￿ and ￿ yield an R&D share in U.S. GDP
of approximately 1 percent which is in line with the ratio of private R&D expenditures in the
investment goods sector to GDP, averaged over the period 1960-2006.
Finally, we ￿x the autocorrelation of the preference/wage markup shock to 0.6 so that the
model generates an autocorrelation that approximately matches that of the total markup as
measured by Gali, Gertler and Lopez Salido (2002). We set the autocorrelation of the TFP
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Figure A1: Impulse Response Functions for Mexico Wage Markup Shock,
        Model Without Adjustment Costs (U.S. dash, Mexico, solid)